More Granular Operating Reserves

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ICAP Working Group/Market Issues Working Group

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Agenda

- Introduction
- Load Pocket Reserves
- Reserve Provider Performance



Introduction



Previous Presentations

Date	Working Group	Discussion points and links to materials
01-08-19	ICAPWG/MIWG	Proposed schedule for accelerating implementation of Zone J operating reserves
01-15-19	ICAPWG/MIWG	Establishing a new Zone J reserve region with a 500 MW 10-minute and 1,000 MW 30-minute reserve requirement
01-24-19	ICAPWG/MIWG	Proposed operating reserve demand curve prices for the Zone J reserve products and the proposed tariff revisions for this initiative Operating Reserve Background
03-04-19	ICAPWG/MIWG	Analysis of potential impact
03-13-19	BIC	Stakeholder vote: Establishing Zone J Operating Reserves
03-27-19	MC	Stakeholder vote: Establishing Zone J Operating Reserves

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Background

- NYISO staff has agreed to consider the following design elements as part of the More Granular Operating Reserves project:
 - ✓ Establishing a reserve region in Zone J (completed).
 - Evaluating load pocket reserves in New York City (NYC).
 - Reviewing performance of resources scheduled to provide reserves.
 - Evaluating the NYCA 30-minute reserve demand curve structure that applies during certain activations of Special Case Resources (SCRs) and Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP) resources.
 - NYISO is including this topic based on feedback from stakeholders including feedback provided during the implementation of the revised scarcity pricing rules in 2016.
 - Specifically, certain stakeholders raised concerns regarding the allocation of reserve MW quantities to the \$500 per MWh and \$750 per MWh pricing steps of the NYCA 30-minute reserve demand curve during SCR/EDRP activations in only part of the state.
 - Reviewing the Zone J reserve demand curve pricing and applicable reserve requirements during Thunderstorm Alerts (TSA).
- The purpose of today's presentation is to discuss load pocket reserves and performance of reserve providers.



Zone J Operating Reserves Timeline

- Stakeholders recently approved the implementation of a Zone J reserve region and associated requirements for June 2019.
 - ✓ January and February 2019 (MIWG/ICAPWG)
 - ✓ Present/discuss market design, associated tariff revisions, and market impacts.
 - ✓ March 2019
 - ✓ Seek stakeholder approval at BIC.
 - \checkmark Seek stakeholder approval at MC.
 - ✓ April 2019
 - ✓ Seek Board of Directors approval.
 - \checkmark File tariff revisions with FERC seeking approval to implement in June 2019.



Load Pocket Reserves



State of the Market Recommendation

- In its 2017 SOM report, the Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) recommended that the NYISO consider implementing local reserve requirements in the New York City load pockets.
 - Further, the MMU recommended that the NYISO model these requirements based on the N-1-1 reliability criteria.

See Recommendation 2017-1 in the 2017 State of the Market Report, located at the following link: https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/2223763/2017-State-Of-The-Market-Report.pdf/cd4ee8a0-1989-dfa0-b53e-2d642c65e46d

NEW YORK INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR

Local Reliability Requirements (LRR)

- There are a variety of reliability rules set by NYSRC for load pockets in NYC which correspond to certain operating conditions.
 - These rules are outlined in the Applications of Reliability Rules.
 - Transmission owners are required to maintain procedures to comply with these reliability rules.
- These can be fulfilled through resource commitments, dispatch reductions, or adjustments to transfer limitations, many of which are out-of-market actions.
 - Currently, the LRRs are evaluated during the first pass of SCUC.
 - If the LRRs have not been met, LRRs may be fulfilled through out-of-market actions, which can result in uplift costs.



Local Reliability Costs

- NYISO's monthly Operations Report provides information on local reliability costs and commitments for NYC.
 - The figure on the right is an example of the information provided in the monthly reports.
 - The monthly Operations Reports are available on the NYISO's website and reviewed at Operating Committee and Management Committee meetings.
- The 2017 SOM noted that the total value of Day-Ahead Bid Production Cost guarantee payments (BPCG) incurred in NYC during 2017 was \$20 million.





Local Reliability Requirements

- As part of this project, the NYISO is exploring the possibility of incorporating local reliability requirements within the market software through load pocket reserve requirements.
 - This effort represents an extension of the recently approved Zone J reserve region proposal to explore the potential further specification of the appropriate geographic dispersion of NYC reserves within Zone J.
- Implementing such requirements offers the potential to provide a targeted procurement of reserves in locations where it is most needed and targeted price signals for resources capable of providing such reserves.
- By modeling these LRRs within the market solution, the commitments would be satisfied through market-based mechanisms.



Load Pocket Reserves - Next Steps

- Determine the load pockets to target for potential reserve regions within NYC.
- Determine the appropriate quantity of reserves to be procured in each identified load pocket.
 - NYISO staff will analyze LRR commitments in each load pocket.
- Determine the appropriate reserve demand curve values for load pocket reserve requirements.

Reserve Provider Performance



State of the Market Recommendation

- The 2017 SOM report provided an evaluation of gas turbine (GT) performance while responding to real-time start-up instructions.
- The MMU estimated that 10-minute GTs provided an average of 61 percent of the MW scheduled, and 30-minute GTs provided an average of 77 percent of the MW scheduled.
 - Performance was measured 10 or 30 minutes, respectively, after an economic start-up signal was received.
 - Based on this analysis, the MMU recommended that the NYISO consider restructuring reserve payments to align with generator performance.¹

1. See Recommendation 2016-2 in the 2017 State of the Market Report, located at the following link: https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/2223763/2017-State-Of-The-Market-Report.pdf/cd4ee8a0-1989-dfa0-b53e-2d642c65e46d



Reserve Audit Process

• The NYISO has the ability to audit reserve providers at any time and without prior notification.

- The audit evaluates the actual response rate of resources.
- The NYISO may conduct audits outside of normal reserve activations, as if an actual emergency existed.

• NYISO Operations staff randomly selects units to audit. No advance notice is provided.

- Three types of audit may be performed: 10-minute response rate test, 30-minute response rate test, and UOL_{N} test.
- NYISO conducts approximately 25-30 audits during each Capability Period.
- If a resource does not perform, or performs poorly, it will fail the audit.
 - The NYISO may derate the response rate and/or UOL_N of a reserve supplier that fails audit.
 - The resource will have the opportunity to propose a correction process to the NYISO.
 - The resource will not be scheduled to supply reserves until it passes a subsequent audit.

1. For more information on Generator Performance Audits, see <u>Technical Bulletin 142</u>.

Reserve Performance

- The NYISO evaluated its reserve performance audit data from reserve audits conducted during the last five years:
 - 10-minute resources have an average 85% pass rate.
 - 30-minute resources have an average 90% pass rate.
- Audits from the two most recent Capability Periods (one winter and one summer) resulted in the following pass rates:
 - 10-minute resources: 88%
 - 30-minute resources: 92%
- These results indicate that suppliers are able to provide reliable reserve capability when called upon by NYISO.



Reserve Performance – Next Steps

Evaluate potential future deactivations.

- NYISO staff will compare the performance of reserve suppliers that may exit the market over the next several years to that of other reserve suppliers.
- Understanding the changing supplier landscape will enable the NYISO and its stakeholders to ensure that the appropriate measures exist to incentivize future reserve providers to perform reliably.

Review details of the MMU's analysis.

- Potomac's analysis considered the performance of GTs offering either 10-minute or 30-minute non-synchronous reserves following an economic real-time commitment.
- NYISO staff will evaluate the MMU's assumptions to ensure that they conform to the NYISO's understanding of reserve performance.
- Continue to review results of reserve performance audits.



Feedback/Questions?

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- Maintaining and enhancing regional reliability
- Operating open, fair and competitive wholesale electricity markets
- Planning the power system for the future
- Providing factual information to policy makers, stakeholders and investors in the power system



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